Five years ago, Nigeria took a bold step. Our dear country was among the early developing countries to adopt a dedicated National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change, demonstrating an early recognition that climate action must address the different vulnerabilities, roles and contributions of women, men, youth and other vulnerable groups.Developed through a participatory process and launched in March 2021, the NAPGCC set out to mainstream gender across climate mitigation, adaptation and finance in five priority sectors – agriculture and land use; food security and health; energy and transport; waste management; and water and sanitation. It was, and remains, a landmark commitment, a recognition that the women who bear the heaviest burden of a warming planet must also be central to the solutions.Now, five years later, an uncomfortable mirror is held before Nigeria by an assessment of the implementation of the National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change, 2021–2025. The assessment, conducted by the Women Environmental Programme in collaboration with the Department of Climate Change of the Federal Ministry of Environment, covered 12 states and the Federal Capital Territory, and identified serious gaps in awareness, coordination, financing and implementation.The 25-page assessment could be summarized in one sentence: Nigeria had a good gender-and-climate policy, but failed to build the institutional machinery, financing, coordination and accountability needed to turn that policy into widespread results.Perhaps this is why the founder and global lead of WEP, Dr Priscilla Achakpa, said at the assessment launch recently, “But let me emphasize: these findings are not a verdict against the NAPGCC; they are a call to action for all of us. And the timing could not be more critical. As Nigeria implements its third Nationally Determined Contribution, NDC 3.0, we have a rare and time-sensitive opportunity to anchor the NAPGCC at the centre of our national climate strategy, backed by real budget lines, a properly resourced secretariat, and sectoral policies that translate commitment into practice.“This will help us move from awareness to accountability, financial institutions opening dedicated windows for gender-responsive climate finance, the Federal Ministry of Environment and the National Council on Climate Change providing the coordination this Plan has long lacked, and civil society, partners and women themselves holding the line on transparency and results.”To me, this report should not be dismissed as another NGO document complaining about government. It should be treated as a diagnosis. And Nigeria should pay attention to the diagnosis before writing the next prescription. The central question is simple: What is the value of a gender-and-climate policy if the women facing the harshest consequences of climate change do not feel its presence in their lives?That is where Nigeria’s climate conversation must begin. Climate change is not gender-neutral. The flood does not enter every household in exactly the same way. Drought does not distribute its burden equally. Rising temperatures do not produce identical consequences for everybody. When agricultural productivity collapses, when water becomes scarce, when energy becomes expensive, when displacement occurs, and livelihoods disappear, the social consequences often fall disproportionately on women and girls.Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Developed through a participatory process and launched in March 2021, the NAPGCC set out to mainstream gender across climate mitigation, adaptation and finance in five priority sectors – agriculture and land use; food security and health; energy and transport; waste management; and water and sanitation. It was, and remains, a landmark commitment, a recognition that the women who bear the heaviest burden of a warming planet must also be central to the solutions.Now, five years later, an uncomfortable mirror is held before Nigeria by an assessment of the implementation of the National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change, 2021–2025. The assessment, conducted by the Women Environmental Programme in collaboration with the Department of Climate Change of the Federal Ministry of Environment, covered 12 states and the Federal Capital Territory, and identified serious gaps in awareness, coordination, financing and implementation.The 25-page assessment could be summarized in one sentence: Nigeria had a good gender-and-climate policy, but failed to build the institutional machinery, financing, coordination and accountability needed to turn that policy into widespread results.Perhaps this is why the founder and global lead of WEP, Dr Priscilla Achakpa, said at the assessment launch recently, “But let me emphasize: these findings are not a verdict against the NAPGCC; they are a call to action for all of us. And the timing could not be more critical. As Nigeria implements its third Nationally Determined Contribution, NDC 3.0, we have a rare and time-sensitive opportunity to anchor the NAPGCC at the centre of our national climate strategy, backed by real budget lines, a properly resourced secretariat, and sectoral policies that translate commitment into practice.“This will help us move from awareness to accountability, financial institutions opening dedicated windows for gender-responsive climate finance, the Federal Ministry of Environment and the National Council on Climate Change providing the coordination this Plan has long lacked, and civil society, partners and women themselves holding the line on transparency and results.”To me, this report should not be dismissed as another NGO document complaining about government. It should be treated as a diagnosis. And Nigeria should pay attention to the diagnosis before writing the next prescription. The central question is simple: What is the value of a gender-and-climate policy if the women facing the harshest consequences of climate change do not feel its presence in their lives?That is where Nigeria’s climate conversation must begin. Climate change is not gender-neutral. The flood does not enter every household in exactly the same way. Drought does not distribute its burden equally. Rising temperatures do not produce identical consequences for everybody. When agricultural productivity collapses, when water becomes scarce, when energy becomes expensive, when displacement occurs, and livelihoods disappear, the social consequences often fall disproportionately on women and girls.Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Now, five years later, an uncomfortable mirror is held before Nigeria by an assessment of the implementation of the National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change, 2021–2025. The assessment, conducted by the Women Environmental Programme in collaboration with the Department of Climate Change of the Federal Ministry of Environment, covered 12 states and the Federal Capital Territory, and identified serious gaps in awareness, coordination, financing and implementation.The 25-page assessment could be summarized in one sentence: Nigeria had a good gender-and-climate policy, but failed to build the institutional machinery, financing, coordination and accountability needed to turn that policy into widespread results.Perhaps this is why the founder and global lead of WEP, Dr Priscilla Achakpa, said at the assessment launch recently, “But let me emphasize: these findings are not a verdict against the NAPGCC; they are a call to action for all of us. And the timing could not be more critical. As Nigeria implements its third Nationally Determined Contribution, NDC 3.0, we have a rare and time-sensitive opportunity to anchor the NAPGCC at the centre of our national climate strategy, backed by real budget lines, a properly resourced secretariat, and sectoral policies that translate commitment into practice.“This will help us move from awareness to accountability, financial institutions opening dedicated windows for gender-responsive climate finance, the Federal Ministry of Environment and the National Council on Climate Change providing the coordination this Plan has long lacked, and civil society, partners and women themselves holding the line on transparency and results.”To me, this report should not be dismissed as another NGO document complaining about government. It should be treated as a diagnosis. And Nigeria should pay attention to the diagnosis before writing the next prescription. The central question is simple: What is the value of a gender-and-climate policy if the women facing the harshest consequences of climate change do not feel its presence in their lives?That is where Nigeria’s climate conversation must begin. Climate change is not gender-neutral. The flood does not enter every household in exactly the same way. Drought does not distribute its burden equally. Rising temperatures do not produce identical consequences for everybody. When agricultural productivity collapses, when water becomes scarce, when energy becomes expensive, when displacement occurs, and livelihoods disappear, the social consequences often fall disproportionately on women and girls.Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. The 25-page assessment could be summarized in one sentence: Nigeria had a good gender-and-climate policy, but failed to build the institutional machinery, financing, coordination and accountability needed to turn that policy into widespread results.Perhaps this is why the founder and global lead of WEP, Dr Priscilla Achakpa, said at the assessment launch recently, “But let me emphasize: these findings are not a verdict against the NAPGCC; they are a call to action for all of us. And the timing could not be more critical. As Nigeria implements its third Nationally Determined Contribution, NDC 3.0, we have a rare and time-sensitive opportunity to anchor the NAPGCC at the centre of our national climate strategy, backed by real budget lines, a properly resourced secretariat, and sectoral policies that translate commitment into practice.“This will help us move from awareness to accountability, financial institutions opening dedicated windows for gender-responsive climate finance, the Federal Ministry of Environment and the National Council on Climate Change providing the coordination this Plan has long lacked, and civil society, partners and women themselves holding the line on transparency and results.”To me, this report should not be dismissed as another NGO document complaining about government. It should be treated as a diagnosis. And Nigeria should pay attention to the diagnosis before writing the next prescription. The central question is simple: What is the value of a gender-and-climate policy if the women facing the harshest consequences of climate change do not feel its presence in their lives?That is where Nigeria’s climate conversation must begin. Climate change is not gender-neutral. The flood does not enter every household in exactly the same way. Drought does not distribute its burden equally. Rising temperatures do not produce identical consequences for everybody. When agricultural productivity collapses, when water becomes scarce, when energy becomes expensive, when displacement occurs, and livelihoods disappear, the social consequences often fall disproportionately on women and girls.Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Perhaps this is why the founder and global lead of WEP, Dr Priscilla Achakpa, said at the assessment launch recently, “But let me emphasize: these findings are not a verdict against the NAPGCC; they are a call to action for all of us. And the timing could not be more critical. As Nigeria implements its third Nationally Determined Contribution, NDC 3.0, we have a rare and time-sensitive opportunity to anchor the NAPGCC at the centre of our national climate strategy, backed by real budget lines, a properly resourced secretariat, and sectoral policies that translate commitment into practice.“This will help us move from awareness to accountability, financial institutions opening dedicated windows for gender-responsive climate finance, the Federal Ministry of Environment and the National Council on Climate Change providing the coordination this Plan has long lacked, and civil society, partners and women themselves holding the line on transparency and results.”To me, this report should not be dismissed as another NGO document complaining about government. It should be treated as a diagnosis. And Nigeria should pay attention to the diagnosis before writing the next prescription. The central question is simple: What is the value of a gender-and-climate policy if the women facing the harshest consequences of climate change do not feel its presence in their lives?That is where Nigeria’s climate conversation must begin. Climate change is not gender-neutral. The flood does not enter every household in exactly the same way. Drought does not distribute its burden equally. Rising temperatures do not produce identical consequences for everybody. When agricultural productivity collapses, when water becomes scarce, when energy becomes expensive, when displacement occurs, and livelihoods disappear, the social consequences often fall disproportionately on women and girls.Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. “This will help us move from awareness to accountability, financial institutions opening dedicated windows for gender-responsive climate finance, the Federal Ministry of Environment and the National Council on Climate Change providing the coordination this Plan has long lacked, and civil society, partners and women themselves holding the line on transparency and results.”To me, this report should not be dismissed as another NGO document complaining about government. It should be treated as a diagnosis. And Nigeria should pay attention to the diagnosis before writing the next prescription. The central question is simple: What is the value of a gender-and-climate policy if the women facing the harshest consequences of climate change do not feel its presence in their lives?That is where Nigeria’s climate conversation must begin. Climate change is not gender-neutral. The flood does not enter every household in exactly the same way. Drought does not distribute its burden equally. Rising temperatures do not produce identical consequences for everybody. When agricultural productivity collapses, when water becomes scarce, when energy becomes expensive, when displacement occurs, and livelihoods disappear, the social consequences often fall disproportionately on women and girls.Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. To me, this report should not be dismissed as another NGO document complaining about government. It should be treated as a diagnosis. And Nigeria should pay attention to the diagnosis before writing the next prescription. The central question is simple: What is the value of a gender-and-climate policy if the women facing the harshest consequences of climate change do not feel its presence in their lives?That is where Nigeria’s climate conversation must begin. Climate change is not gender-neutral. The flood does not enter every household in exactly the same way. Drought does not distribute its burden equally. Rising temperatures do not produce identical consequences for everybody. When agricultural productivity collapses, when water becomes scarce, when energy becomes expensive, when displacement occurs, and livelihoods disappear, the social consequences often fall disproportionately on women and girls.Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. That is where Nigeria’s climate conversation must begin. Climate change is not gender-neutral. The flood does not enter every household in exactly the same way. Drought does not distribute its burden equally. Rising temperatures do not produce identical consequences for everybody. When agricultural productivity collapses, when water becomes scarce, when energy becomes expensive, when displacement occurs, and livelihoods disappear, the social consequences often fall disproportionately on women and girls.Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Yet a strange contradiction persists in our climate governance. We acknowledge that women are vulnerable to climate change, but we do not always give them the resources to become architects of the solution. We invite them to conferences but do not necessarily put money in their hands. We celebrate their resilience but do not always finance their enterprises. We talk about inclusion but leave them outside the room where the climate budget is designed. This is precisely why the WEP assessment matters.The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. The problem was never simply the absence of a policy; Nigeria already had a National Action Plan on Gender and Climate Change covering 2021–2025. The assessment reveals that the problem was the gap between policy and practice. The WEP found limited awareness of the NAPGCC among relevant institutions, weak coordination between gender and climate actors and the absence of dedicated public financing mechanisms to support implementation.This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. This is the familiar Nigerian policy disease: implementation without an engine. A policy cannot run on goodwill. It needs money. It needs institutions. It needs people who are responsible. It needs measurable targets. It needs data. And, perhaps most importantly, it needs somebody with enough authority to ask every year: What have you achieved?Related NewsIran war triggers cooking gas supply crunch, Nigeria hitLights off, gas on: Why Nigeria and Ghana can’t quit fossil fuels yetSAN canvasses funding for African clean energy innovatorsWithout these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Without these things, even the most progressive policy can become what I call a ceremonial document – something that looks impressive when displayed but has little power to change reality. Nigeria must therefore resist the temptation to simply produce NAPGCC 2.0 as another sophisticated document with no bite. The next plan must be an implementation machine.Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Firstly, we must learn from the low awareness that trailed the first. One of the most striking findings is that many government institutions and stakeholders did not know enough about the NAPGCC – or sometimes did not know it existed at all. Knowledge was concentrated among a relatively small group of technical officials and climate/gender specialists. Dissemination depended heavily on occasional workshops and civil-society initiatives instead of a sustained government communication system. In other words, Nigeria wrote the policy, but did not sufficiently communicate it to the people expected to implement it.Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Secondly, the assessment found that Nigeria was doing gender-responsive climate work, including climate-smart agriculture for women, clean cooking initiatives, women’s livelihoods in recycling, and gender-responsive climate planning; but many of these initiatives were not explicitly implemented under the NAPGCC. Consequently, good projects remained isolated rather than becoming part of a coordinated national system.Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Thirdly, there were virtually no dedicated or very few government budget lines for implementing the NAPGCC at federal and state levels. Implementation consequently depended heavily on donors and CSOs. That creates a vicious cycle whereby no dedicated budget led to donor dependence that resulted in weak national ownership – hence limited continuity and poor scaling.Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Fourth, no adequately resourced national multi-stakeholder platform or secretariat drove gender- and climate implementation. At state level, inter-ministerial structures were often absent or inactive, as climate and gender institutions frequently operated in separate silos. Interestingly, the assessment found that some states that created formal coordination structures performed better – suggesting that the problem is solvable.Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Fifthly, there was a near absence of reliable sex-disaggregated data. This means that Nigeria could not properly measure its success. For example, a programme might report that 10,000 people benefited but not adequately establish: how many were women; how many were men; whether women actually gained economically; whether vulnerable groups benefited; whether women gained decision-making power; or whether climate resilience actually improved.Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Without such data, government cannot properly demonstrate impact or hold implementing institutions accountable.Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Sixthly, the assessment found weak connections between federal and state implementation, with local governments and communities largely excluded. It also highlights groups whose needs were often overlooked, including persons with disabilities and internally displaced persons. This is particularly important because climate impacts are experienced locally – through floods, drought, food insecurity, water scarcity, heat, displacement, and livelihood losses.Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. Nevertheless, the report sees Nigeria’s third Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Climate Agreement as an opportunity, and argues that the country should use the current climate-policy moment – particularly NDC 3.0, the National Adaptation Plan and emerging climate-finance opportunities – to rebuild the gender-and-climate architecture.The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document. The next version of the Plan, i.e., NAPGCC 2.0, 2026 – 2030, should be costed; based on SMART indicators [specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound]; sex-disaggregated; disability-inclusive; tied to government budgets; linked to NDC 3.0 and the National Adaptation Plan; backed by a permanent coordination mechanism; monitored through measurable performance indicators; and treated as an accountability framework rather than simply another policy document.