FidelAmaky, a Ghanaian geopolitical and security analyst and founder of DefSEC Analytics Ltd, writes from Accra, GhanaThe United States and Nigerian strike that killed Abu Bilal al-Minuki in a well-coordinated operation on May 16, 2026, was an important step forward in the war against terrorism in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.The extremist leader led one of the bloodiest insurgencies in the region and built a reputation for brutality within Islamic State networks in Africa and beyond. He developed a sophisticated logistics network and a level of resilience that often outpaced the Nigerian military, increasing the perceived invincibility of the group he led, the Islamic State West Africa Province.Even though the strike permanently neutralised the terrorist leader, experts expressed concerns about its aftermath. One major concern was the group’s succession plan and how a new leadership structure could worsen the security situation in Nigeria and the wider region.Similar situations have been observed in the Middle East and the broader West Asian region, where leadership decapitation sometimes produced dire and highly lethal consequences. In northern Nigeria, the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, while in police custody, escalated the insurgency and led to the emergence of even more radical leaders from among the group’s ranks.Another major issue that emerged after the elimination of al-Minuki was the possibility that ISWAP would exploit the porous borders of countries in the Lake Chad Basin to escape intensifying offensives by Nigerian forces. The strike boosted military morale, and there were expectations that Nigeria would seek to capitalise on the momentum by attempting to dislodge ISWAP from its strongholds.The Lake Chad Basin lies at the intersection of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. For centuries, people in the region have interacted freely, and the subsequent division of the territory among different states has rarely prevented such contact. Consequently, while borders remain hard in a legal sense, they are highly porous in practice and have been exploited by various non-state actors, including organised criminal groups. ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters have utilised these porous borders for years to frustrate government military operations.Long before the terrorist threat became pronounced in the basin, the countries of the region had recognised those vulnerabilities and established the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Its purpose was to manage the shared water resources of Lake Chad and address the challenges associated with the region. Three decades later, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created under the commission to combat banditry and other forms of organised crime. Thus, by the early 1990s, states in the region had already recognised the need for a coordinated security approach to address cross-border threats. Despite these efforts, armed groups continued to exploit the porous borders to their advantage.Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. The United States and Nigerian strike that killed Abu Bilal al-Minuki in a well-coordinated operation on May 16, 2026, was an important step forward in the war against terrorism in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.The extremist leader led one of the bloodiest insurgencies in the region and built a reputation for brutality within Islamic State networks in Africa and beyond. He developed a sophisticated logistics network and a level of resilience that often outpaced the Nigerian military, increasing the perceived invincibility of the group he led, the Islamic State West Africa Province.Even though the strike permanently neutralised the terrorist leader, experts expressed concerns about its aftermath. One major concern was the group’s succession plan and how a new leadership structure could worsen the security situation in Nigeria and the wider region.Similar situations have been observed in the Middle East and the broader West Asian region, where leadership decapitation sometimes produced dire and highly lethal consequences. In northern Nigeria, the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, while in police custody, escalated the insurgency and led to the emergence of even more radical leaders from among the group’s ranks.Another major issue that emerged after the elimination of al-Minuki was the possibility that ISWAP would exploit the porous borders of countries in the Lake Chad Basin to escape intensifying offensives by Nigerian forces. The strike boosted military morale, and there were expectations that Nigeria would seek to capitalise on the momentum by attempting to dislodge ISWAP from its strongholds.The Lake Chad Basin lies at the intersection of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. For centuries, people in the region have interacted freely, and the subsequent division of the territory among different states has rarely prevented such contact. Consequently, while borders remain hard in a legal sense, they are highly porous in practice and have been exploited by various non-state actors, including organised criminal groups. ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters have utilised these porous borders for years to frustrate government military operations.Long before the terrorist threat became pronounced in the basin, the countries of the region had recognised those vulnerabilities and established the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Its purpose was to manage the shared water resources of Lake Chad and address the challenges associated with the region. Three decades later, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created under the commission to combat banditry and other forms of organised crime. Thus, by the early 1990s, states in the region had already recognised the need for a coordinated security approach to address cross-border threats. Despite these efforts, armed groups continued to exploit the porous borders to their advantage.Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. The extremist leader led one of the bloodiest insurgencies in the region and built a reputation for brutality within Islamic State networks in Africa and beyond. He developed a sophisticated logistics network and a level of resilience that often outpaced the Nigerian military, increasing the perceived invincibility of the group he led, the Islamic State West Africa Province.Even though the strike permanently neutralised the terrorist leader, experts expressed concerns about its aftermath. One major concern was the group’s succession plan and how a new leadership structure could worsen the security situation in Nigeria and the wider region.Similar situations have been observed in the Middle East and the broader West Asian region, where leadership decapitation sometimes produced dire and highly lethal consequences. In northern Nigeria, the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, while in police custody, escalated the insurgency and led to the emergence of even more radical leaders from among the group’s ranks.Another major issue that emerged after the elimination of al-Minuki was the possibility that ISWAP would exploit the porous borders of countries in the Lake Chad Basin to escape intensifying offensives by Nigerian forces. The strike boosted military morale, and there were expectations that Nigeria would seek to capitalise on the momentum by attempting to dislodge ISWAP from its strongholds.The Lake Chad Basin lies at the intersection of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. For centuries, people in the region have interacted freely, and the subsequent division of the territory among different states has rarely prevented such contact. Consequently, while borders remain hard in a legal sense, they are highly porous in practice and have been exploited by various non-state actors, including organised criminal groups. ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters have utilised these porous borders for years to frustrate government military operations.Long before the terrorist threat became pronounced in the basin, the countries of the region had recognised those vulnerabilities and established the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Its purpose was to manage the shared water resources of Lake Chad and address the challenges associated with the region. Three decades later, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created under the commission to combat banditry and other forms of organised crime. Thus, by the early 1990s, states in the region had already recognised the need for a coordinated security approach to address cross-border threats. Despite these efforts, armed groups continued to exploit the porous borders to their advantage.Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. Even though the strike permanently neutralised the terrorist leader, experts expressed concerns about its aftermath. One major concern was the group’s succession plan and how a new leadership structure could worsen the security situation in Nigeria and the wider region.Similar situations have been observed in the Middle East and the broader West Asian region, where leadership decapitation sometimes produced dire and highly lethal consequences. In northern Nigeria, the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, while in police custody, escalated the insurgency and led to the emergence of even more radical leaders from among the group’s ranks.Another major issue that emerged after the elimination of al-Minuki was the possibility that ISWAP would exploit the porous borders of countries in the Lake Chad Basin to escape intensifying offensives by Nigerian forces. The strike boosted military morale, and there were expectations that Nigeria would seek to capitalise on the momentum by attempting to dislodge ISWAP from its strongholds.The Lake Chad Basin lies at the intersection of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. For centuries, people in the region have interacted freely, and the subsequent division of the territory among different states has rarely prevented such contact. Consequently, while borders remain hard in a legal sense, they are highly porous in practice and have been exploited by various non-state actors, including organised criminal groups. ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters have utilised these porous borders for years to frustrate government military operations.Long before the terrorist threat became pronounced in the basin, the countries of the region had recognised those vulnerabilities and established the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Its purpose was to manage the shared water resources of Lake Chad and address the challenges associated with the region. Three decades later, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created under the commission to combat banditry and other forms of organised crime. Thus, by the early 1990s, states in the region had already recognised the need for a coordinated security approach to address cross-border threats. Despite these efforts, armed groups continued to exploit the porous borders to their advantage.Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. Similar situations have been observed in the Middle East and the broader West Asian region, where leadership decapitation sometimes produced dire and highly lethal consequences. In northern Nigeria, the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, while in police custody, escalated the insurgency and led to the emergence of even more radical leaders from among the group’s ranks.Another major issue that emerged after the elimination of al-Minuki was the possibility that ISWAP would exploit the porous borders of countries in the Lake Chad Basin to escape intensifying offensives by Nigerian forces. The strike boosted military morale, and there were expectations that Nigeria would seek to capitalise on the momentum by attempting to dislodge ISWAP from its strongholds.The Lake Chad Basin lies at the intersection of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. For centuries, people in the region have interacted freely, and the subsequent division of the territory among different states has rarely prevented such contact. Consequently, while borders remain hard in a legal sense, they are highly porous in practice and have been exploited by various non-state actors, including organised criminal groups. ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters have utilised these porous borders for years to frustrate government military operations.Long before the terrorist threat became pronounced in the basin, the countries of the region had recognised those vulnerabilities and established the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Its purpose was to manage the shared water resources of Lake Chad and address the challenges associated with the region. Three decades later, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created under the commission to combat banditry and other forms of organised crime. Thus, by the early 1990s, states in the region had already recognised the need for a coordinated security approach to address cross-border threats. Despite these efforts, armed groups continued to exploit the porous borders to their advantage.Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. Another major issue that emerged after the elimination of al-Minuki was the possibility that ISWAP would exploit the porous borders of countries in the Lake Chad Basin to escape intensifying offensives by Nigerian forces. The strike boosted military morale, and there were expectations that Nigeria would seek to capitalise on the momentum by attempting to dislodge ISWAP from its strongholds.The Lake Chad Basin lies at the intersection of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. For centuries, people in the region have interacted freely, and the subsequent division of the territory among different states has rarely prevented such contact. Consequently, while borders remain hard in a legal sense, they are highly porous in practice and have been exploited by various non-state actors, including organised criminal groups. ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters have utilised these porous borders for years to frustrate government military operations.Long before the terrorist threat became pronounced in the basin, the countries of the region had recognised those vulnerabilities and established the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Its purpose was to manage the shared water resources of Lake Chad and address the challenges associated with the region. Three decades later, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created under the commission to combat banditry and other forms of organised crime. Thus, by the early 1990s, states in the region had already recognised the need for a coordinated security approach to address cross-border threats. Despite these efforts, armed groups continued to exploit the porous borders to their advantage.Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. The Lake Chad Basin lies at the intersection of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. For centuries, people in the region have interacted freely, and the subsequent division of the territory among different states has rarely prevented such contact. Consequently, while borders remain hard in a legal sense, they are highly porous in practice and have been exploited by various non-state actors, including organised criminal groups. ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters have utilised these porous borders for years to frustrate government military operations.Long before the terrorist threat became pronounced in the basin, the countries of the region had recognised those vulnerabilities and established the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Its purpose was to manage the shared water resources of Lake Chad and address the challenges associated with the region. Three decades later, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created under the commission to combat banditry and other forms of organised crime. Thus, by the early 1990s, states in the region had already recognised the need for a coordinated security approach to address cross-border threats. Despite these efforts, armed groups continued to exploit the porous borders to their advantage.Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. Long before the terrorist threat became pronounced in the basin, the countries of the region had recognised those vulnerabilities and established the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1964. Its purpose was to manage the shared water resources of Lake Chad and address the challenges associated with the region. Three decades later, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created under the commission to combat banditry and other forms of organised crime. Thus, by the early 1990s, states in the region had already recognised the need for a coordinated security approach to address cross-border threats. Despite these efforts, armed groups continued to exploit the porous borders to their advantage.Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. Therefore, concerns that recent efforts by U.S. forces and their Nigerian partners could be undermined by the very geography they seek to secure from al-Minuki and ISWAP were grounded in both historical experience and present realities.Related NewsTroops kill 274 insurgents as Nigeria records 882 attacksPlateau gunmen kill nine family members, two-month-old babyState police will end insecurity in North, says BarauThe initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. The initial strikes on May 16 were followed by additional U.S. strikes and a ground offensive by the Nigerian military targeting multiple ISWAP bases in northeastern Nigeria. Through those follow-up operations, ISWAP was denied the opportunity to organise a smooth succession process capable of planning major reprisal attacks. Since then, the only significant attack reported has been a militant assault that killed three Nigerian soldiers. Sustaining the emerging campaign of effective surveillance, precision strikes, and ground offensives could partially, or even decisively, cripple ISWAP in northeastern Nigeria.The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. The U.S. administration has remained committed to security cooperation with Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Washington recognises that a sustained application of force, combined with domestically led non-kinetic approaches, could help turn the tide against extremist groups like ISWAP. What is particularly noteworthy is the manner in which the United States and Nigeria have simultaneously addressed the vulnerabilities created by porous borders.Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. Over the last half-decade, the United States has faced significant challenges in maintaining security cooperation across the region. These difficulties have largely resulted from political instability, which itself has often been driven by insecurity, extremism, and the activities of armed groups.Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. Washington withdrew forces from Chad following the death of long-time ruler Idriss Déby and the political and constitutional crisis that followed. U.S. forces returned only after elections signalled a degree of political stability. Another major setback was the loss of a significant U.S. drone base in Niger. The end of its presence following Niger’s 2023 coup removed a critical surveillance capability from the region.As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. As a result, U.S. security cooperation within the core Lake Chad Basin countries became concentrated in Nigeria and Cameroon.In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. In recent times, however, Washington and Abuja, recognising the strategic implications of the region’s porous borders, have sought to re-engage states across the basin. This has involved either restoring relations with governments, as in the case of Niger, or strengthening existing partnerships. Both countries have engaged Niamey and are working with the Nigerien forces against ISWAP.U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. U.S. cooperation with Cameroon, particularly in the Far North Region, is being revitalised, while Chad remains an important security partner. The recent border security agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon further strengthens regional security efforts at a time when ISWAP is increasingly under pressure. The cumulative effect of these initiatives is the strengthening of security across a complex and vulnerable geography that has long been exploited by extremist groups.The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region. The current offensive against ISWAP and other armed groups in the Lake Chad Basin is not only intense and sustained but also increasingly comprehensive. Improved security cooperation across the basin, led by Nigeria and closely supported by its principal international partner, America, is likely to contribute significantly to the degradation of militant capabilities and could ultimately help pave the way for the defeat of extremist groups operating in the region.